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Analyzing The Efﬁciency of Agent-based Web services: Communities
Consideration
Mahsa Alishahi Tabrizi
Recently, a number of frameworks have been proposed to aggregate rational agent-based web
services having the same functionalities but different non-functional characteristics inside com-
munities with the aim of enhancing their capabilities of providing the required services. For an
agent-based web service, deciding about functioning alone or within a community is a challeng-
ing problem that still needs to be investigated. Moreover, most of the proposed frameworks are
considering either only competitive or cooperative behaviors of web services within their com-
munities. However, some of the proposed frameworks suggest that web services within these
communities although they are competing to get requests from users, may also exhibit a coopera-
tive behavior, so web services are said to be coopetitive. Deciding which strategy to adopt within
a community, competing or cooperating, is still an open question.
In this thesis, we propose a game-theoretic-based framework addressing the impact of joining a
community on the efﬁciency of web services. The objective is to help web services decide about
joining communities or acting alone. We also introduce a mechanism web services can use to
effectively choose coopetitive strategies within communities which bring maximum utility. In this
direction, we investigate web services’ characteristics and their expected utilities over different
iii
strategies. We enable web services that are hosted in communities with reasoning capabilities to
enhance their quality of strategic interacting mechanisms as decision making procedures. The
ultimate objective is to measure the threshold that web services can use in order to decide about
different interacting strategies. Moreover, we develop a simulated environment where we analyze
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During the past decade, intelligent agents and multi-agent systems have extensively absorbed
attention and turned out to be popular topics in computer science in general and artiﬁcial in-
telligence in particular. In this domain, investigations about web services as abstract intelligent
and autonomous agents have attracted increasing interest in service computing [7, 21, 38, 48].
These agent-based web services are used as means of promising interoperable software applica-
tions. Coordinations and interactions among agent-based web services happen according to their
incomplete knowledge about the environment where they reside. Agent-based web services in
a multi-agent setting try to gain information from other agents or provide and request services
from peers. These kinds of interactions make trust and reputation assessments important [23,36].
Moreover, considering web services as rational agent-based systems give them the capability
of making decisions about competing or cooperating with other services in their environments
to enhance their reputation and efﬁciency in general. Thus, measuring and observing the ef-
ﬁciency parameters and behaviors of these web services require designing sound and accurate
frameworks.
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This chapter introduces the context of research, which is about analyzing the efﬁciency of agent-
based web services, for example in terms of reputation and payoff. The analysis is conducted
considering the concept of community, which is a group of web services having similar function-
alities but probably different non-functional properties and the role of a controller agent named
the master web service to observe and control the behaviors and interactions among web services
inside the community to provide a trusted community environment [26,29,31]. The chapter also
discusses the two main issues we address in this thesis: (a) analyzing the impact of joining a
community on the efﬁciency of single web services; and (b) analyzing the efﬁciency of those
web services within their communities by investigating their cooperative and competitive behav-
iors. Moreover, the chapter summarizes the contributions of the thesis and outlines the thesis
organization.
1.1 Context of Research
Web services are software programs that are deployed to serve and maintain application to ap-
plication interactions. These web services can be abstracted as (or represented by) software au-
tonomous agents which are capable of engaging in rational interactions [21,49]. This abstraction
will enable web services to have social attitudes and characteristics and decide about behavioral
strategies in terms of cooperating and competing with other peers [6]. In fact, agents are soft-
ware systems that can sense the environment they reside in and are able to react to the changes
in that environment following their own goals. Autonomous agents can exhibit selﬁsh and thus
malicious behavior [20], which raises the issue of managing and controlling such agents. In
2
autonomous agent-based web services environments, this behavior is managed by means of rep-
utation assessment, which is considered as the basis for service selection. In fact, having better
quality of service leads to higher reputation and thus more service requests.
Service request overloading and lack of responsiveness are two main issues for single web ser-
vices. The process of ﬁnding and selecting suitable services is another challenge in service com-
puting settings. Regarding these issues, introducing communities which gather several agent-
based web services with the same functionality but different non-functional characteristics has
been emerged [6, 26, 29, 31, 32]. The concept of communities of web services enhances the ser-
vice reliability in general as services can replace each other. However, gathering agent-based
autonomous web services in a community raises some management challenges such as invit-
ing or accepting web services as new members of the community, ﬁring or rejecting existing
web services, maintaining or dismantling the community. These activities and other community
management issues are handled by the master web service. Within communities, reputation is
evaluated by the community’s representative and controller, called the master web service, based
on the feedback provided by service users on the received quality of service.
This thesis is about increasing the efﬁciency of agent-based web services within their commu-
nities. Increasing the efﬁciency in terms of overall payoff is the ultimate goal in every business
setting. In service computing, efﬁciency can be deﬁned in terms of the number of requests a
service can receive and handle, and is function of several parameters such as reputation, market
share and capacity. A particularly challenging issue in this context is the interactions and behav-
iors of web services inside a community. Different strategies can be adopted by web services to
increase their efﬁciency, such as cooperating, competing, and combining cooperation and com-
petition with other peers. Deciding about which strategy to choose is still an open issue and this
3
thesis is an attempt in this direction.
1.2 Problem Statement
In this thesis, two issues are addressed and investigated: (a) web services’ efﬁciency by joining
or leaving the communities of web services; and (b) web services’ competitive/cooperative be-
haviors (simply called coopetitive behaviors), decision making about when to compete and when
to cooperate inside the community, and the role of this decision making in increasing the efﬁ-
ciency and hence service income. Regarding the ﬁrst issue, a model in which web services either
act alone or cooperate with other web services within a community is presented. Each single
web service or community of web services manages its efﬁciency parameters such as reputation,
market share, and capacity. There are also service users that select services based on their reputa-
tion. Each entity seeks maximum efﬁciency following strategies of joining/leaving a community,
accepting/refusing a request to join a community, and inviting to join a community. In different
scenarios, we investigate the situation that maximizes players’ efﬁciencies. The goal is to inves-
tigate strategies as rational behaviors that web services and communities can adopt to increase
efﬁciency.
Regarding the second issue, a model is introduced to help web services in their decision making
process when these web services function within communities. This model presents a mecha-
nism where web services in the community could choose either to compete for an announced
task, or to cooperate with other competing web services in the same community to accomplish
some subtasks of the announced task. The objective of this model is to enable web services to
reasonably evaluate and decide over their coopetition strategies, which means when to compete
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and when to cooperate.
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
1. The ﬁrst contribution is the design of a multi-agent environment as distributed network of
web services and service users. A community infrastructure has been designed by extend-
ing the work done in [31] to host web services. In this contribution, the task allocation
problem is regulated by a mechanism taking reputation, market share, and capacity into
account. The attributes of rational services are formalized and a game-theoretic analysis
has been conducted to investigate the stabilized situation within which entities achieve high
efﬁciency. This work identiﬁes a threshold allowing web services to decide about joining
or leaving a community. In different scenarios, we investigate the situation that maximizes
players’ efﬁciencies.
2. The second contribution builds on and extends the ﬁrst contribution and proposes a mech-
anism within which web services in the community could choose either to compete for an
announced task, or to cooperate with other competing web services in the same commu-
nity to accomplish some subtasks of the announced task. It introduces the strategic decision
making procedures that enable web services to apply different techniques to constrain high
efﬁciency and obtain the maximum utility. In the presented mechanism, web services de-
cide to compete based on their level of conﬁdence which we call growth factor and is a
function of their reputation, quality of service and budget over time. If their level of conﬁ-
dence is higher than a threshold obtained by a game-theoretic technique, web services bid
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for tasks. In this model, a reward and penalty mechanism is applied by the master web
service towards web services that accomplish tasks, either alone through competition or
by cooperation with other web services. The web services’ expected payoffs and involved
probabilities that are used to choose over the two interacting strategies are calculated and
investigated in this contribution. As intelligent entities, web services are equipped with a
reasoning technique that enhances their abilities over best acting strategies and the attitude
they could exhibit to yield maximum utility.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This chapter discussed the context, motivation, and contributions of the research work done in
this thesis. The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the background and
some deﬁnitions about agents and multi agent systems, web services and communities of web
services and ends by discussing the behaviors of web services inside a community following
by some deﬁnitions in game theory. Chapter 3 presents the proposed game-theoretic model in
which web services either act alone or cooperate with other web services within a community to
investigate rational behaviors that web services and communities can adopt to increase efﬁciency.
It also describes the proposed simulation framework and experimental results. Chapter 4 extends
the idea proposed in chapter 3 by exploring in detail the type of interactions that web services
can choose. We analyze the impact of deciding to compete or cooperate with peers within the
same community by making use of a game-theoretic model. Simulation and experimental results
are also presented in this chapter. Chapter 5 concludes this work and discusses further ideas and




2.1 Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
For many years, agent has been perceived as an important concept in artiﬁcial intelligence, com-
puter science, and even in the business discipline. Several deﬁnitions have been proposed for
agents in the literature and each of which follows different purposes. Some of them are very
general deﬁnitions while others are speciﬁc so that they apply only for limited settings. In this
thesis, we consider the deﬁnition inspired by Wooldridge and Jennings in [47, 49] according to
which, an agent is an entity that enjoys the following properties:
1. Autonomy. Each agent has control over its actions without any direct human or other
interventions.
2. Social ability. Using a kind of communication language, agents are able to interact with
each other or with humans.
3. Reactivity. Agents can sense the environment in which they reside. They respond to this
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environment changes in a timely manner.
4. Pro-activeness. Agents do not simply react based on environment changes, but they follow
their goals by taking their own initiatives.
In a more comprehensive deﬁnition [50], agents are considered as intentional systems with human
characteristics such as beliefs, desires, knowledge and commitments. Some of these character-
istics are categorized under Information Attitudes [49] which generally include the information
of the agent about its surrounding world and some of them are part of the category of Pro-
attitudes [49] that are guidance for agents to take the right actions.
A Multi-Agent System (MAS) is a distributed system composed of multiple interacting au-
tonomous agents [48]. The knowledge about the world or environment is distributed among
agents locally. None of the agents has a global or complete knowledge about the other agents or
the environment. For this reason, agents need to continuously interact with one another. In this
regard, agents (are supposed to) complete each other’s knowledge and capability to accomplish
different types of tasks. This has an important inﬂuence on the interactions among agents, since
each agent acts based on a partial vision about the other agents’ states. Based on the type of the
system and goal of the agents, different models of interactions are deﬁned in multi-agent systems
which we are going to discuss in Section 2.4.
2.2 Web Services
Web services are application-to-application programs or Service Oriented Applications (SOA)
[34] which are used to model and accelerate solving real world business problems. These highly
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abstracted loose-coupling language-independent interfaces describe the network-accessible inter-
actions and operations through standardized XML messages. A set of formal XML messages de-
ﬁne service descriptions that provide all the details necessary for service interactions. WSDL [10]
which is an abbreviation for Web Service Description Language expresses these web service de-
scriptions [16]. The Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) which is an XML-based protocol
for messaging and remote procedure enables communications between web services [13]; and
the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) [9] directory is a registry for web
services descriptions. As fruitfully argued in [5, 6, 18, 30, 44], web services could be abstracted
and represented by agents to equip them with intelligence and decision making abilities.
According to the deﬁnition of web services in [8], web service architecture provides the message
exchange between software agents. This message exchange mechanism has three main compo-
nents (Figure 2.1):
1. Service requester agent. This agent is the software agent that request services from some
other software agents.
2. Service provider agent. This kind of agent is responsible to provide services for other
software agents which are called service requesters.
3. Service registry. The service requesters can ﬁnd the appropriate service providers descrip-
tions in service registry.
Three operations are deﬁned in web service architecture [16]:
1. Publish. A service provider publishes its service description in detail in the service registry.
2. Find. A service requester then ﬁnds its required service description in the service registry.
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Figure 2.1: Web Service Architecture
3. Bind. The service requester agent binds to the found service provider agent at a particular
web location and starts interacting with it.
2.3 Communities of Web Services
The idea of gathering web services with similar functionalities but different non-functional char-
acteristics in a group called community of web services is proposed in [5,6,31]. The main purpose
of the community in [31] is having better accessibility to web services and makes ﬁnding the ap-
propriate service providers with speciﬁc functionalities easier.
The purpose of having a community structure as mentioned in [31] is to make it easier to discover
web services with a speciﬁc functionality. This approach requires more discussions about rules
and guidelines for managing the community. The following questions are addressed in this con-
text: How to initiate and setup a community, how to manage web services in a community, how to
reconcile conﬂicts inside a community and between communities, and when to dismantle a com-
munity. Web services may join, leave, become unavailable temporarily, or resume their actions
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in a community. As mentioned in [5, 29], a community provides a way of responding to desired
services without explicitly referring to any speciﬁc web service which is really providing the ser-
vice at runtime. Communities of web services should have an added-value for both the service
provider and the service requester. From the service requester’s perspective, the provided quality
of service (QoS) by a community should be higher than the one provided by a single web service,
which would justify the use of such community instead of direct relation with the single service.
From a service provider or a web service’s point of view, service income is the important factor.
The concept of community of web services enhances the service reliability in general since at the
time of failure or overload of one of the service providers, other web services inside the commu-
nity can be used as substituters. Also, web services may exhibit different attitudes. Sometimes
they cooperate with each other to gain more beneﬁts and sometimes they compete. They also
can announce misleading information to enhance their participation opportunities in composites
or gain better credit. So there should be a monitoring system to follow web services behaviors
closely to avoid malicious actions. This monitoring component is called Master Web Service
(Figure 2.2), while other web services inside a community are called slaves. The master web
service can be a completely new type of agent whose responsibility is only observation of web
services or it can be one of the web services inside the community that has better management
capabilities comparing to others. In this thesis, we consider the master web service as an agent
who is in charge of managing the community and observing web services interactions inside the
community. In the next chapters, the master web service is considered as the representative of
the community of web services.
In the architecture proposed in [31] which we are going to discuss more in Chapter 3, Section
3.1, service providers publish their web services properties in an UDDI registry. One of the
11
Figure 2.2: Community of Web Services Architecture [29]
responsibilities of master web service is to ﬁnd web services by consulting with UDDI registries
and attract them to join its community as well as to ﬁre the web services that have not acted
based on their advertised properties. Also, providers of web services can suggest their web
services to master web service to invite them to join the community. The other responsibility
of master web service is selecting web services to participate in a composite web service to
perform a desired task. At any time, the master web service can analyze the performance of
the community and decide to maintain the current status, enhance or dismantle the community
which it is responsible for. Another role of master web service is to discover and punish the
malicious web services inside the community. The ability of master web service in this latter role
denotes the reputation of the community of web services and is of a high importance for both
service requesters and service providers, because it shows how reliable is a community. Gathering
web services with the same functionality but different non-functional properties develops the
new interactions and behaviors among web services inside the community. We are speciﬁcally
interested to investigate different types of interactions and strategies that web services choose
when they subscribe into a community. Analysis of these strategies enables the master web
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service to reach high performance while supervising the community. We will discuss two of the
most important interaction strategies in the next section: cooperation and competition.
2.4 Cooperation and Competition
Previously in this section, we promoted the agents, multi-agent settings and abstracted web ser-
vices that are hosted in communities. In a typical community of web services, a task could be
accomplished with a single web service or with an aggregation of a group of web services’ con-
tributions. This is called cooperation. Cooperation happens when a web service cannot handle
its service request because of overload or any kind of failure, and another web service substi-
tutes the failed web service. Sometimes a complex request is accomplished by a cooperation
among web services inside the community. In the context of communities, we distinguish web
services cooperation from web services composition. By cooperation, we mean that the commu-
nity aggregates web services capable of interacting with one another to manage allocated tasks,
for example by allowing a web service to replace another that is incapable of executing a task. By
composition, we mean the extension initiated by a web service to other web services to ﬁnalize
a speciﬁc task that the initiator web service cannot perform alone. The cooperation concept is a
well-known term in the sense that it represents group work and its requirements [14]. It is worth
to note that we use terms cooperation and collaboration in this thesis interchangeably. However,
inside a community there would be some additional constraints that are applied by the master web
service. We discuss more about the effectiveness of cooperative behaviors among web services
inside a community in Chapter 3. Besides cooperation, there is competition, which represents
web services’ tendency to obtain a task or to take part in compositions while they have other
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competitors residing in the same community. Being more realistic and practical, web services
intend to exhibit both cooperative and competitive behaviors in the same community for different
purposes, simultaneously. This behavior is called coopetition, which is a very popular subject in
business-related context [4,11,42,52], but only recently a few coopetition frameworks have been
proposed in the web service and community-related literature [32, 33]. We are interested in the
study of these two behaviors and how they could be distinguished and correlated. In this thesis,
we will further investigate the inﬂuence of each behavior on the performance of the community
as a whole. Moreover, we will study the outcomes of these behaviors and the decision making
procedures while residing in a community with continuous tasks in Chapter 4.
2.5 Game Theory
By a game we mean roughly a situation of conﬂict between two or more people, in which each
contestant, player, or participant has some, but not total, control over the outcome of the conﬂict
[43]. Strategy is the action that players choose and exhibit for playing in the game. In some cases
players cannot deterministically choose from their strategies, so they randomly select among
these pure strategies with certain probabilities [45]. This latter is called a Mixed Strategy. A
game can be analyzed as a one-shot or a repeated game. One of the important solution concepts
in game theory is Nash Equilibrium which is a strategy proﬁle where the strategy of each player is
a best response to the other strategies. In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle so




A Game Theoretic Approach for Analyzing
the Efﬁciency of Web Services in
Collaborative Networks
As mentioned earlier in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, web services cooperate in order to increase their
efﬁciency, which is the ultimate goal in business settings. Efﬁciency in service computing can be
deﬁned in terms of the number of requests a service can receive and handle, which is a function
of different parameters such as service reputation, market share and capacity. To address the ef-
ﬁciency issue, there have been efforts attempting to model and analyze collaboration among web
services. Moreover, many frameworks [5, 6, 29, 31] have been proposed towards communities of
web services (Section 2.3) and task allocation management, which we will discuss in this chapter
and Chapter 4 in more details. In all the proposed frameworks on collaboration, the objective
is to increase efﬁciency in distributed computing. However, in such frameworks, strategies web
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services can follow to achieve this goal are very limited to simple cooperation case and more so-
phisticated strategies have not been thoroughly analyzed and investigated yet. Such sophisticated
strategies can help communities and single web services achieve higher efﬁciency.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate strategies as rational behaviors that web services and
communities can adopt to increase efﬁciency. We present a game-theoretic model in which web
services either act alone or cooperate with other web services within a community. Each entity
(single web service or community of web services) manages its reputation, market share, capac-
ity, and efﬁciency parameters. There are also service users that select services based on their
reputation. A game is deﬁned between typical single web service and the representative of a typi-
cal community (master web service). Each entity seeks maximum efﬁciency following strategies
of joining/leaving a community, accepting/refusing a request to join a community, and inviting
to join a community. In different scenarios, we investigate the situation that maximizes players’
efﬁciencies. Overall contributions of this chapter are threefold:
1. We provide a distributed network of web services and users where reputation, market share,
and efﬁciency are taken into account.
2. We propose a game-theoretic analysis investigating the stabilized situation within which
entities achieve high efﬁciency.
3. We identify a threshold allowing the web service to decide about joining/leaving the com-
munity.
In the rest of this chapter, we discuss relevant related work in Section 3.1. Then we deﬁne
the efﬁciency metrics we take into account in our model (Section 3.2). After that, we present
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our game-theoretic model in Section 3.3. Our proposed framework and experimental results are
provided in Section 3.4.
3.1 Related Work
In many frameworks [3, 19, 22, 24, 35, 37] proposed in the literature, service selection and task
allocation are regulated based on the reputation parameter. We discuss these proposals in Section
3.1.1. All these models address the reputation in environments where web services function
alone. In such models, web services efﬁciency is not discussed in details and in general, balancing
the market share with the capacity is not considered as an issue for web services besides their
reputation.
There have been few models addressing the communities of web services. The objective is to
facilitate and improve the process of web service selection and effectively regulate the process of
request and task allocation. We will consider them more in detail in Section 3.1.2. In general, the
recent aforementioned proposals motivate the existence of communities rather than single func-
tional web services, but fail to systematically provide potential beneﬁts and technically compare
different scenarios that increase service providers’ efﬁciency.
3.1.1 Reputation-Based Service Selection
To make interactions between agents and service selection in an intelligent system environment
robust, there should be a technique or tool to let agents discover services automatically. To differ-
entiate between these services, the proposed framework in [3] introduces an automated service
discovery and selection of web services based on a user’s trust policy. This framework is validated
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by a case study of data mining web services. The issues addressed in this paper include describing
and discovering web services semantically by the concentration on high level conceptual basis
and not the details, and an automatic mechanism to select trustworthy services from the user’s
trust policy perspective. The proposed framework makes use of a case study identiﬁed in FAE-
HIM project [3], and they show that the factors which play a role in the ﬁnal decision making for
service selection in this case study are dependent on the user’s trust disposition. This framework
has three main components that discover and match services in a reputation-based mechanism.
A matchmaker semantically discovers services, and then a composer component gathers a com-
bination of services with the same functionality as requested and a reputation manager which
selects a service from the service combination using the reputation metrics. Resource providers
periodically advertise their available services with their capabilities to one or more matchmakers.
Users activate the matchmaker by sending a query containing their type of resource they want.
Different algorithms are used for different service categories. By matchmaking the services in
this framework, there is no need for the user to have low level knowledge about services or var-
ious data mining algorithms. And instead of just a random selection from available services, a
trust-based service selection is done by a service selector in the framework.
According to the limited knowledge of the agents, they self-organize into community structures
to share information locally. The contribution demonstrated in [19] tries to show how such locally
shared information increases the service demand stability and leads into self-organized commu-
nity structure. The authors in [19] propose a multi-agent model in which agents have a limited
knowledge about the availability of the service providers. Meanwhile the demand for particular
services changes over time. Hence to provide service more effectively and responding to the de-
mand changes in a proper manner, agents organize and share their information locally with each
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other. Three issues have been addressed in this model:
1. What service types should be offered by which providers in order to satisfy the current
demand.
2. How to minimize the competition by utilizing what providers known to a customer.
3. How to organize the system to have a better balance between demand and supply for a
particular service type.
In this model, consumer agents monitor the service provider they know locally. They use the
gained knowledge for their future decisions about service requests and they share this knowledge
once establishing a community. While the providers have the capability to offer different types of
services over time to respond to changing in the demands requested by community of consumers,
these providers are allowed to advertise and provide just one service at a time. The decision about
which service to offer is made based on the providers previous experience of the consumers
demands for each service. When the number of providers and consumers is equal and static,
service supply may converge to satisfy demand. By this model which is an adaptive multi-agent
system, the relationship between the quantity of information exchanged and the size of emergent
neighborhoods and also the formation of stable local communities is discussed.
A new QoS attribute, termed verity, and an architecture to quantify this attribute is introduced
in [24]. The authors try to prove that verity should be taken into account in quality-driven selec-
tions and compositions of web services. They believe that verity is a better and more intuitive
indicator of the service provider’s trustworthiness. Verity is measured by external components
and is the ability to retain the difference between the proposed and provided service metrics in
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their lowest level. In this context, reputation is deﬁned as a vector of verity, user feedback or a rat-
ing system and compliance level. Compliance is the normalized difference between the proposed
QoS attributes values and the real provided values. As a mean to measure verity, the variance in
the compliance levels is being considered shows the ability of service provider in providing the
same level of service as it had promised. Lower the variance, the more successful the service
provider in delivering the consistent service. Verity is obtained from the past service invocations
and the past calculated variances. This new attribute indicates how effectively QoS attributes
have been delivered. Therefore the service selection in a quality-driven scenario should be done
using verity along with some other well-known and widely used service attributes like response
time, availability or performance and so on. Users and service brokers can have different values
of verity of services for themselves.
A conceptual model for reputation has been described in [37]. This model explains how to orga-
nize and manage the information related to reputation and how this information and reputation,
itself, can facilitate the service selection process. New service initiation and evolution over time
in a system, how these new services can be recognized and discovered, the aggregation of right
information of these services along with a formal deﬁnition of them as service quality are ad-
dressed in this contribution. The proposed model is a generic conceptual model that can be
enhanced based on different domains.
A multiagent framework based on QoS and a new model of trust within which, the providers
are able to advertise for their services, the users can express their preferences and the ratings of
services can be gathered and shared has been developed in [35]. Service ratings in this system
are based on quality properties and are obtained via automatic monitoring or user input. By
sharing the ratings, the agents can form an environment in which they are able to help each
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other by providing information regarding services which can be a help for other agents towards
better service selections. Indeed, service selection can be rationally done only in an empirical
basis, that is, how an agent or service really acts or behaves and not only how it advertises. An
agent called explorer agent is being considered in this framework to monitor the different service
implementations, specially the ones that are new or idle. It allows the customers to better ﬁnd
the services suitable to their required QoS, even if there is not adequate positive experience with
such implementations available. In general, the proposed system works based on self-adjusting
trust model.
Another framework which works based on service level agreement and considers the actual de-
livered QoS as a basis for price calculations is proposed in [22]. A reputation mechanism is
introduced and used in this framework to monitor the promised QoS and the delivered one. The
authors show that both providing the promised service by service provider and sending correct
reports about the received service by users are optimal. The latter is provided by a scoring
rule. Monitoring the services and transactions among agents is necessary to avoid any kind of
malicious behaviors. Here the monitoring is done by customers themselves. So it raises two
problems regarding honest feedbacks from clients and collusion between providers and clients.
In this framework, service providers repeatedly offer the same service to the clients but with dif-
ferent QoS parameters, and then all the evaluations are done based on these parameters and the
difference between the promised QoS parameters and the provided ones. The idea behind this
framework is to discourage service providers from advertising untruthful and higher QoS param-
eters than they are really able to afford. To this end, a penalty will be applied to the untruthful
service providers. This penalty is directly proportional to the difference between the promised
and the delivered QoS such that the untruthful service provider will obtain less price than if it
21
had advertised the real QoS. Reputation information is used to compute the penalty value. The
other enhancement is considered for the clients in this framework such that clients are got paid
for submitting the honest feedback. Here the authors emphasize on the rational clients who can
analyze the changes in the environment and can see the beneﬁts of reporting the truth rather than
a false feedback.
3.1.2 Communities of Web Services
Two protocols have been followed in the development of the community in [31], Contract Net
Protocol (CNProtocol) and Web Services Community Development Protocol (WSCDProtocol).
Since the main reason for developing a community in this approach is web services functional-
ities, ﬁrst of all, for inviting web services, their functionalities are mapped into the community
functionality, and after that the credentials of selected web services are checked by master. This
latter has dual advantages: ﬁrst, it avoids dealing with malicious web services in the future and
second, it enhances the trustworthiness level of master web services towards slaves. This security
level can enhance the opportunity of community to attract single web services to join the com-
munity and users to send requests to the community. However, there is always a chance for a web
service to become lazy after joining a community or act maliciously. In these cases the master
will decide to eject or punish the malicious web service. Meanwhile, if the master evaluates the
conﬁguration of the community as a poor conﬁguration, it decides to dismantle the community.
Task allocation is done based on CNProtocol. The master sends a call for bids. Slave web ser-
vices which are available respond. The best bid is chosen and the selected web service is get
notiﬁed. The rest of web services are notiﬁed as well. The processes of joining and leaving and
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monitoring slaves are followed by CNProtocol, WSCDProtocol, or a combination of both.
While speaking about the community of web services, the reputation of such communities be-
comes an issue. Analyzing the reputation of communities of web services and single web ser-
vices and comparing them with each other are discussed in [25–27]. The reputation mechanism
is mainly working based on the users’ feedbacks. In [25], a model to rank different communities
of web services and single web services is been proposed. The discussion then is extended by
analyzing the single web services beneﬁts and incentives of joining a community of web services.
The service reputation is calculated considering two factors: satisfaction and inDemand. It means
the reputation has been measured based on the obtained feedbacks and previous provided service.
This model and the model proposed in [26] are extensions of the work done in [27] within which,
the assessment of reputation of communities of web services is done based on the after-service
feedbacks provided by the users and these feedbacks are get supervised and veriﬁed in order to
avoid fake feedbacks. In [26], a time factor is added to the analysis of reputation, called recency.
The whole idea in [25–27] is about maintaining a sound reputation mechanism by encouraging
agents to avoid malicious behaviors like providing fake feedbacks or collusion and to discourage
communities of web services to provide a unreliable service to users by penalizing the malicious
communities and agents.
3.2 Efﬁciency Metrics
Feedback is a rating value that can be −1 or 1, posted by a user to express satisfaction about the
provided service. Feedback are accumulated in the feedback ﬁle to compute and analyze the web
service’s reputation.
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Reputation is a value between 0 and 1 computed from the feedback ﬁle. Web services, as rational
entities, aim at increasing this value to maximize their income. We compute the reputation value
of a single web service wi ,Rwi , and a community of n web services cj ,Rcj , in Equation 1. In this
equation, PFwi denotes the number of positive feedback posted for the web service wi and TFwi
represents the total submitted feedback to this web service. These parameters could be evaluated









Market Share is a value between 0 and 1 denoting the portion of the total requests directed to
the web service (or community) to all initiated requests. The value is computed in Equation 2. In










Capacity is a parameter denoted by Cpwi that the web service wi holds as an individual attribute.
This value is ﬁxed and only reﬂects the service total ability in handling simultaneous requests.








In this section, we formalize the attributes of rational services. In general, all rational entities,
including users and web services, tend to maximize their efﬁciencies. Here, we only consider
the perspective of web services. Thus, we propose a heuristic (see Equation 4) for computing the
efﬁciency Ex as a function f of Rx,Mx and Cpx where x ∈ {wi, cj}
Ex = f(Rx,Mx, Cpx) (4)
The function f should satisfy the following properties.
Property 1. f is continuous.
This property says that at each moment the efﬁciency of a web service or a community can be
evaluated with respect to the current attributes.
Property 2. f is strictly increasing in RX and MX .
This property says that the efﬁciency of the service increases if it holds high reputation and market
share in the system. Consequently, services and communities will have incentive to do better to
get their overall efﬁciency increased.
Property 3. f is monotonically decreasing in MX − CpX .
This property says that the efﬁciency of a service or a community decreases if it fails to make a
good balance between its capacity and the requests it should handle. Consequently, services and
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communities will have incentive to analyze their capacities and manage to have acceptable market
share. The idea is that the more service provider entity succeeds in making balance between its
capacity and market share, the higher the efﬁciency would be.
Equation 5 gives a possible deﬁnition of f .
f =
Rx ×Mx
|Mx − Cpx|+ 1 (5)
Theorem 1. The function f satisﬁes Properties 1, 2 and 3.
Proof. Satisfaction of Property 1 is straightforward as all the parameters are deﬁned at each





, which are clearly positive. Property 3 can be proved by considering
|Mx−Cpx| as a variable, say v and compute the partial derivative ∂f∂v , which is manifestly positive.
The other attribute that categorizes services is the risk factor SX . This factor shows how ﬂexible
the service is in loosing its efﬁciency. For example, if the risk factor associated with wi is %20
(Swi = 0.20), then the web service wi would consider any situation in its strategy analysis where
estimated efﬁciency is more than %80 of its current efﬁciency. Ewi is deﬁned as the estimated
efﬁciency of the web service wi after taking any strategy for updating its status (Ecj would corre-
sponds to the community cj). To this end, the web service wi would discard all the strategies (and
choices of updating the current status) that yield an estimated efﬁciency less than (1− Swi)Ewi .
The reason behind using the provider risk factor is that web services or communities need to be
ﬂexible in choosing strategies. For the rest of this section, we discuss two different cases where
the web service is outside and inside the community. In each case, we analyze the best strategies
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that culminate in maximum efﬁciency level for both the web service and community. We cal-
culate the efﬁciency in different strategies of joining/leaving a community, accepting/refusing a
request to join a community using Equation 5.
3.3.1 Web Service Out of Community
In this scenario, the single web service wi is facing the community cj with different strategies
that would end in either the single web service wi joins the community cj or not. This action
could be initiated or ceased by the web service or community representative. Doing so, there are
four different cases:
1. wi attempts to join cj , Jwi,cj , and the attempt is accepted, Awi,cj .
2. wi attempts to join cj , JR
cj
wi , but cj refuses the join request, JRwicj .
3. cj invites the web service wi, SIwicj , but wi refuses the invitation, SI
cj
wi .
4. there is neither invitation from cj nor join request from wi
From the outcome perspective, the cases of “wi attempts to join and cj accepts" and “cj invites
and wi accepts" are similar. However, refusal from any party would lead to different estimated
efﬁciencies and this is why we consider them as two separated cases. In the following, we
compute the estimated efﬁciency of each entity with respect to the taken action.
Case (1) The web service wi takes the risk (Swi) of joining the community. It would update its
reputation, market share and capacity parameters respectively in Equations 6, 7, and 8 where n
denotes the current cardinality of the community set (since we distinguish between web services










Cpwi = Cpwi (8)
In this case, our assumptions are as follows:
1. The reputation of a web service would be updated to the average of the community rep-
utation. To this end, each registered web service in the community holds its individual
reputation, but broadcasts the public reputation of the community.
2. We consider the capacity as a ﬁxed attribute. Therefore, the capacity of the web service
stays unchanged, but the community accumulates the joined web service’s capacity.
When it comes to the market share, the community simply accumulates the market share of the
new web service. However, the joined web service is going to obtain a share of total market
share from the community. The corresponding attribute updates regarding the community cj are
formulated in Equations 9, 10, and 11.
Rcj = Rwi (9)
Mcj = Mcj +Mwi (10)
Ccj = Ccj + Cwi (11)
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In this case, both entities consider the estimated parameters and compute their new efﬁciency
values (see Equation 5). The case would take place when the following inequalities hold:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (2) In this case, wi requests joining, but the community does not accept the request. The
difference between the cases (1) and (2) is that in case (1) the join takes place, which brings
actual updated efﬁciency for both entities. However, in case (2) the join does not take place,
which keeps the analysis at the estimation level. The corresponding estimated efﬁciencies are
characterized by the following inequalities:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (3) This case is similar to the case (2), except the fact that the refusal is caused by the web
service. The corresponding estimated efﬁciencies are characterized by the following inequalities:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
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Case (4) In this case, both entities are not encouraged to attempt joining and therefore, the join
does not take place. In this case, we have:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
3.3.2 The Game Set up for Single Web Service
Upon the discussed cases, we develop a game-theoretic model consisting of the web service wi as
player 1 and community cj as player 2. The player 1 follows the strategy proﬁle of (join/not join)
when is initiating the game (i.e. play ﬁrst), and follows the strategy proﬁle of (accept join/refuse
join) when is reacting to the opponent’s move (i.e. play second). Since for our analysis it is
only important whether the join takes place or not, the order of playing does not matter when
calculating payoffs (represented in terms of efﬁciency). Table 3.1 shows the assigned payoffs for
both players in different cases. As shown in the table, the values of Jwi,cj and Awi,cj are the gen-
eralized form of “join/accept" or “invite/accept join" cases. These values are actual differences
in efﬁciency values after the join (E ′wi and E
′
cj
). The obtained payoffs could be either positive or
negative. The negative payoff denotes a wrong decision the entity regrets. The payoffs obtained
in the other cases are all upon estimations.
The developed game is only a one-stage game between a typical web service and a typical com-
munity. The game could be set up between any other two entities and is repeated over time when
entities are active in the network. Moreover, rational entities consider the information obtained
in one game in their further strategy analysis. We formalize the results we obtain from the set up
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Table 3.1: Payoff regarding 2 players when web service is outside the community.
game between these entities in the following.
Proposition 1. In one-stage game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In the set up one-stage game, the payoff of web services regarding accepted join request
(Jwi,cj ) could be either more or less than that of refusing the invitation (as it refers to the actual
efﬁciency evaluation). This is also the case for the master of the community. Consequently, there
is no dominant strategy for any player. Therefore, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium can be
found.
As consequence of this proposition, there is no stable situation rational entities can try to achieve
by playing the game. Both players should then consider the risk parameter in their strategy
selections. To this end, we deﬁne web service and community’s mixed strategy probabilities
respectively as wi(Swi , 1 − Swi) and cj(Scj , 1 − Scj). Thus, we compute web services expected
payoff αwi of join (or accept to join) versus the mixed strategy proﬁle of the community in
Equation 12. Equation 13 computes the related value regarding the refusal of join.
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αwi(join, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = Scj(Jwi,cj) + (1− Scj)(JRcjwi) (12)
αwi(stay, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = Scj(SIcjwi) + (1− Scj)(0) (13)
The web service aims at maximizing its payoff. Therefore, for all adopted strategies, we need to
consider the best response (to the other player) and discard the others. For instance, if the web
service obtains a higher expected payoff with the joining strategy, it would change its probability
proﬁle to (1, 0), so the join would be the dominant strategy.
Since each player in each stage game chooses between only two strategies, and since any of
these strategies could be the best response in a particular situation, we analyze the case where
the expected payoffs are equal. By so doing, we can compute a threshold (μwi), which is used
to identify which strategy is dominant. The threshold μwi is used by the master to control the
expected payoff of the web service in the sense that the web service adopts the master’s desirable
strategy as dominant. Thus, the master would pay the least possible cost to obtain its desirable
control on the web services. This eventually would lead to the control mechanism of the master
web service over cardinality of the community set. The threshold is computed in Equation 14.
αwi(join, cj(Scj , 1− Scj)) = αwi(stay, cj(Scj , 1− Scj))
⇒ Scj(Jwi,cj) + (1− Scj)(JRcjwi) = Scj(SIcjwi)









The threshold μwi obtained in Equation 14 is in terms of the estimated efﬁciency Ewi , which
could be changed by the master cj . So if the expected efﬁciency of join is computed to be more
than μwi , the web service wi would adopt the join strategy or accept the invitation to join. We
have then the following result.
Proposition 2. In mixed strategy one-stage game, there is a threshold μwi such that if Ewi > μwi ,
joining the community would be the goal of the web service. Otherwise, the web service wi would
not join the community.
Corollary 1. If the master web service considers the expected efﬁciency value computed by the
web service and provides (broadcasts) a reputation value that let Ewi exceeds μwi , the master
can control adopting strategy of the web service.
3.3.3 Web Service in the Community
In the previous sections, we analyzed the case where the web service wi was acting alone outside
the community cj . We also set up a game and analyzed the payoffs regarding different adopting
strategies. In this part, we analyze the same system where the web service wi is already acting
in collaboration with other web services inside the community cj . In this case, the web service
chooses its actions from strategy proﬁle of “leave/accept to leave" or “stay/refuse to leave" (we
assume that any action that ends up in changing the status of the web service is being made
upon agreements between the web service and master of the community). The community cj
also refers to the strategy proﬁle of “accept of leave/ﬁre" or “refuse the leave/not ﬁre". Doing so,
there are four different cases:
(a) wi attempts to leave the community cj , Lwi,cj , and the attempt is accepted, Fwi,cj ;
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(b) wi attempts to leave, LR
cj
wi , but cj refuses the leaving request, LRwicj ;




(d) there is neither ﬁring from cj nor leaving request from wi.
Similar to the case where the web service was outside the community, we analyze the cases with
their parameter updates.
Case (a) The web service wi that takes the risk of leave (Swi) would update his reputation, market








In this case, our assumptions are as follows:
1. The reputation of a web service would be back to its previous individual reputation (R′′wi).
To this end, each registered web service in the community holds its individual reputation
when joining a community. However, the community recalculates its average reputation.
2. We consider the capacity as a ﬁxed attribute. Therefore, the capacity of the web service
stays unchanged but the community reduces the left web service’s capacity.
A similar analysis can be obtained for the market share where M ′′wi is the previous value. The
corresponding attribute updates regarding the community cj are formulated in Equation 16.
Rcj=
n(Rcj)−Rwj
n− 1 Ccj = Ccj − Cwi Mcj = Mcj −Mwi (16)
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In this case, both entities consider the estimated parameters and compute their new efﬁciency
values (see Equation 5). The case would take place when the following inequalities hold:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (b) In this case, wi attempts to leave, but the community does not accept the leaving request.
The difference between the cases (a) and (b) is the same as explained in the previous section. We
have then the following inequalities:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj ≥ (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (c) This case is similar to the case (b) except the fact that the refusal is caused by the web
service:
Ewi ≥ (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
Case (d) In this case, both entities are not encouraged to attempt leaving:
Ewi  (1− Swi)Ewi
Ecj  (1− Scj)Ecj
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3.3.4 The Game Set up for the Joined Web Service
In this section, we also develop the game-theoretic analysis consisting of the web service wi as
player 1 and community cj as player 2. The player 1 follows the strategy proﬁle of (leave/not
leave) when is the initiator and follows the strategy proﬁle of (acceptance ﬁre/refuse ﬁre) other-
wise. Table 3.2 shows the assigned payoffs for both players in different cases. As shown in the
Table, the values of Lwi,cj and Fwi,cj are the generalized form of “leave/accept" or “ﬁre/accept




The obtained payoffs could be either positive or negative. We formalize the results we obtain
from the set up game between these entities in the following.
Proposition 3. In one-stage game, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one given for Proposition 1.
Referring to the obtained payoffs shown in Table 3.2, we would have the same best response
analysis that we did in the case for the single web service. To this, the obtained threshold μwi is
set the same.
Proposition 4. In mixed strategy one-stage game, there is a threshold μwi such that if Ewi >
μwi , leaving the community would be the goal of the web service that is already member of the
community. Otherwise, the web service wi would not leave the community.
Corollary 2. If the master web service considers the expected efﬁciency value computed by the
web service and provides a market share value that let Ewi exceeds μwi , the master can control
the strategy of the web service.
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The market share offered to the web service by the community could cause dissatisfaction of the
joined web services. Thus, this would generate a low Ewi value, which would cause the web
service to leave considering its previous individual efﬁciency value.
3.4 Proposed Framework and Experimental Results
We used a realistic multi-agent simulator in a .net platform and developed many agents with
broad range of characteristics and capabilities. In the multi-agent based environment, we exposed
dynamism in agents’ actions and therefore, we could obtain results that are based on the per-
formed realistic experiments. In the implemented environments, there are three types of agents:
1. user agents,
2. web service agents, and
3. master web service agents that represent communities
We do not emphasize the user agents for the sake of simplicity. However, in general, they look for
best possible service (either from a single or a community of web services). During simulation
runs, web services and users might leave or join the network.
For our implementation environment, we choose Visual Studio 2010 IDE [12] as our Integrated
Development Environment, and CSharp.net as the language of programming. For each type
of agents, we deﬁne an object oriented class. Each class of objects has its own properties and
methods (see Figure 3.1). In addition to these classes, we have a constant class which holds
basic and static values used for service initialization. This latter ﬁle makes the framework more
ﬂexible, because we can observe the different behaviors of the agents by changing the set up
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values in the constant ﬁle very easily. As we mentioned earlier, we do not focus on the user agent
class, but only on the web service and master web service classes.
Figure 3.1: Web service, community and constant parameters classes
Web Service has a unique ID and some properties such as Capacity, Reputation, MarketShare,
and RiskFactor. These properties are set at the beginning of the simulation. Web service has
another important property, namely efﬁciency which is calculated and updated during the simu-
lation in each run.
Community (MasterWeb Service) has also a unique ID and several properties such as Capacity,
Reputation and MarketShare. Each community has a list of web services that have joined the
community.
We tried to design and implement this framework as ﬂexible as possible such that it can be
extended for other purposes very easily. In fact, we extended these classes by adding some other
properties and methods in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.
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Table 3.4 provides the details regarding the implemented environment. We categorize the web
services and masters based on the risk they take in adopting strategies. There are three classes of
services that obtain different payoffs during the games.
In this section, we investigate the characteristics of the single web services that act alone outside
the community. During the simulation runs, we set up a number of one-stage games analyzing
the strategies that web services take in different situations. We repeat the same process using
three different classes of the web services according to their risk attribute. Figure 3.2 illustrates
6 plots categorizing three different types of single web services that are involved in the one-stage
game regarding joining the community. In plots (a), (b), and (c) the x-axis denotes community’s
public reputation that is broadcasted by the player 2 (cj) in the game. The y-axis denotes the
percentage of the web services that considered to join the community. In this experiment, the
community is willing to accept joining web services since its market share is not balanced with
its limited capacity (Mcj > Ccj ). As it is shown in plots, there are different joining percentages
regarding the situation that either encourages or discourages most of the web services. In Figure
3.2, plots (d), (e), and (f) illustrate the average efﬁciency comparison between the case where the
web service was acting alone (the dotted curve) and the case where the web service joined the
community (the bold curve). The updates in efﬁciencies clarify the extent to which the joining
strategy is chosen wisely. In this experiment, the community adopts its strategies according to its
individual efﬁciency analysis regardless of the threshold that could lead the web services to join.
We also launch the experiment with the community representative that is capable of analyzing the
threshold that would enhance the control of the master web service over the adopting strategies
of the single web services willing to join and obtain higher efﬁciency. Figure 3.4 plots the same
group of web services (categorized in plots (a), (b), and (c)) facing a community whose master
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Figure 3.2: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on joining a community.
web service analyzes the threshold that could encourage the web services to join. As shown in
this ﬁgure, cj is more successful in games with players that hold relatively high risk attribute.
In lower risky web services, the community is more successful in absorbing the web services by
advertising higher reputation. This fact is promising according to web services’ desire to increase
self- efﬁciency. However, the community facilitates the joining process and meanwhile, obtains
the control on the strategies that the web services adopt. Thus, the master web service acts better
compared to the case where the master web service considers self parameters in games.
We carry on the experiments with analysis on the efﬁciency updates regarding the joined web
services that are involved in one-stage game facing the community representative. Figure 3.4
illustrates 6 plots categorizing three types of web services according to their risk attribute class.
These plots illustrate the percentage of leaving the community together with their corresponding
efﬁciency update. As it is clear in plots (a), (b), and (c), the web services with lower risk levels act
more or less according to their satisfaction of joining the community. Therefore, the percentage
of leaving is decreased by increasing the reputation of the community. Note that the public
reputation of the community cannot be faked in this case as long as the web service is already
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member of the community. The experiment shows the web services with higher risk level could
adopt leaving strategy with weaker reasoning mechanism. Consequently, we observe a more
chaotic behavior of the joined web service with higher risk level acting in a community with
relatively low reputation value. This chaotic percentage is regulated while the reputation of the
community is increased. In this case, the web services consider to refuse the leave.
Figure 3.3: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on joining and leaving a community
while threshold being investigated.
Figure 3.4: Efﬁciency of three categorized web services on leaving a community.
Figure 3.4 plots (d), (e) and (f) illustrate the leaving percentage of the web services in the same
experiment but facing a community that manages to recognize the threshold μwi . In these plots we
observe a better handling of the web services, which reﬂects community’s success in controlling
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the adopting strategies of the web services.
In Figure 3.5, we compare the total efﬁciency of different communities categorized based on their
efﬁciencies (Scj = 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8). In these plots, the bold curves represent the efﬁciency of
the community when the threshold μwi is taken into account and the dotted ones represent the
community when the threshold is not taken into account. As shown in the plots, the efﬁciency of
communities are enhanced when they consider the computed threshold. The results show us that
the efﬁciency of the web services is higher when the threshold μwi is being considered.
Figure 3.5: Efﬁciency of three categorized communities of web services.
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Table 3.2: Payoff regarding 2 players when web service is inside the community.










Table 3.3: Environment characteristics
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Chapter 4
Analyzing The Efﬁciency of Coopetition
Strategies of Services within Communities
In the previous chapter, we proposed a community infrastructure designed to host web services
as a multi-agent environment. We focussed on web services’ efﬁciencies in their continuous
interacting strategies. Using game theory, we analyzed the best acting strategy and the ways a
community can constrain high overall performance. In this chapter, we extend this framework
by exploring the types of interactions that web services can choose while they reside in a given
community. We go further to analyze the impact that each one of these types could make on the
overall efﬁciency of web services.
Deciding about which strategy to choose and when web services are competing but still need to
cooperate to accomplish complex tasks is still an open issue. We propose analyzing those dif-
ferent strategies to help web services in their decision making process when these web services
function within communities. The objective is to enable web services to reasonably evaluate and
decide over their coopetition strategies, which means when to compete and when to cooperate.
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More precisely, we propose a mechanism within which web services in the community could
choose either to compete within their community for an announced task, or to cooperate with
other competing web services in the same community to accomplish some subtasks of the an-
nounced task. We explore details behind the strategic decision making procedures and enable
web services to apply different techniques to constrain high efﬁciency and obtain the maximum
utility. We investigate web services’ expected payoffs and the involved probabilities that are used
to choose over the two interacting strategies.
As intelligent entities, agent-based web services require a reasoning technique that enhances their
abilities over best acting strategies and the attitude they could exhibit to yield maximum utility.
In this chapter, we obtain some theoretical results about the decision making process that could
be used by a typical web service.
In the rest of this chapter, we discuss about related work in Section 4.1. Then we deﬁne the
metrics we use in our investigations in Section 4.2. we extend this chapter by providing a model
for web services decision making procedure in Section 4.3. We close this chapter by providing
experimental results in Section 4.4.
4.1 Related Work
Our contribution in this chapter is the proposition of a model to analyze the efﬁciency issue of
active services within their communities. The proposed framework considers the best response
strategy to maximize the expected payoff and determine the threshold, so that a decision over
competing or cooperating can be made.
In many frameworks [3, 19, 22, 24, 35, 37] proposed in the literature, service selection and task
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allocation are regulated based on the reputation parameter. In some other frameworks [2, 5, 25]
the cooperative behaviors of web services are discussed and observed. The proposed frameworks
mostly aim to facilitate the coordination mechanism between web services. However, the oppo-
site strategy of cooperating is not analyzed where web services might be more successful when
competing within a same group. In fact, web services are not always willing to cooperate even if
they have some common goals, particularly when they operate within groups such as communi-
ties. In such a context, web services can follow different interacting strategies and have to decide
when to compete and when to cooperate so that their ultimate goal, maximizing their incomes,
can be better achieved. In Chapter 3, we discussed about some of the related work; in this chapter,
we will address other related work on interactions between web services in communities of web
services and the coopetition strategy.
Engineering of communities of web services with the focus on the social interactions between the
web services inside the community is the subject of research in [33]. In the proposed framework
ﬁve types of interactions are deﬁned, which are supervision, competition, substitution, collabora-
tion and recommendation. And the attributes considered for web services are selﬁshness, fairness
and unpredictability. Competition happens when web services try to take part in a composition
inside a community and at the same time they cooperate with each other by substitution in the
time of failure. This is a simple form of coopetition. However, this type of relation is not dis-
cussed in this paper. Here two types of web services are deﬁned: master web service and slave
web service. Supervision is master web service task and its goal is to assign requests to the most
appropriate slave web services inside the community. For this purpose, a weighted unidirectional
edge between master web service and the slave web service is deﬁned. The weight of the edge
is dependent on the three parameters, which are the functionality similarity level between master
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web service and the slave web service, the trust level which is about how conﬁdent the master
web service is in the capability of the slave web service to fulﬁll and satisfy the user’s request,
and the response level that shows the acceptance rate of the slave web service to the demand of
the master web service to satisfy the user’s requests. This weighted edge is called Supervision
Level. The more the supervision level is close to one, the more similar is the slave web service in
functionality to the master web service and hence, is more appropriate to be selected for a user’s
request. For competition relation, a weighted bidirectional edge is considered between two slave
web services. To evaluate the weight of this edge which is referred to as Competition Level, two
values are considered, functionality similarity level and non-functionality similarity level. The
more closer is the value of competition level to one, the more similar two slave web services are,
therefore, the ﬁrst slave web service threatens the competitiveness capacity of its peer. Another
type of collaboration relation is deﬁned in this framework, which is between different groups of
slave web services inside a community. These groups are interacting with each other through
a speciﬁc slave web service named "focus" slave web service. Again in this type of relation, a
weighted unidirectional edge is drawn between focus slave web service and slave web services
in each group. The weight of this edge is referred to as Collaboration Level and is calculated
based on the number of times that both slave web services in different groups of web services
participated in joint compositions. Recommendation relation is also deﬁned when at least a good
number of compositions are completed and is dependent on the number of times a slave web ser-
vice accepted to take part in joining a composition and denotes how much that slave web service
likes to work with a speciﬁc joint composition. The selﬁshness of a slave web service is when it
does not show a positive behavior towards its master web service or other peers in the community.
The master web service rewards a slave web service either if that slave web service accepts to
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participate in a joint composition or substitute another slave web service when needed. On the
contrary, the master web service will penalize the slave web service who does not participate in
a joint composition at run-time despite its prior acceptance or if it continuously declines to act
as a substitution. After all, the authors discuss about the unpredictability property of a slave web
service. This happens when a slave web service accepts the composition request for example, but
it acts in opposite.
A heuristic algorithm to evaluate cooperation and competition behaviors of agents towards each
other in the environment is proposed in [46]. In this context, only those tasks that need combi-
nation of multiple agents efforts to be completed are considered. To this end, both cooperative
and competitive approaches are taking place. A two step procedure is proposed. In the ﬁrst step,
the agents have to evaluate the tasks and in the second step, they need to determine the agents
which can help them complete the tasks. Four different agent types are deﬁned here. No sin-
gle agent possesses all the required skills to complete a task individually, so coalitions must be
formed. These coalitions are formed in a way that maximizes the payoff received by the agents.
The agents are rational and evaluate and compare their payoff in both cases of doing a task indi-
vidually or participating in a coalition. In this framework, for a particular skill, the base fee is a
non-decreasing function of skill level and is publicly known. The fee for a given skill-level pair is
taken from a normal distribution with known mean and standard deviation. Four heuristics have
been indicated in this work for task selection by agents:
1. Individual proﬁt task selection in which the agent selects the task that maximizes its own
proﬁt.
2. Global proﬁt task selection that will maximize global proﬁt.
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3. Best ﬁt task selection within which the sum of under-utilization for the agent is minimized.
4. Coopetitive selection that selects the best ﬁt task as long as it is within P% of the maximum
individual proﬁt, for a given P ﬁxed by the designer.
And there are two coalition selection heuristics:
1. Best proﬁt coalition selection in which for each subtask, the agent selects the supporting
agent with the minimum fee.
2. Best ﬁt coalition selection within which for each subtask, the supporting agents with the
minimum under-utilizations are selected.
The authors hypothesize that if the environment is very competitive or the number of tasks to be
done is less than the number of agents, an agent will be more interested in accepting the other
agents’ proposals.
Based on the previous works done in coalition formation area, there are three main activities
in the coalition formation process; determining the value of each coalition, ﬁnding the group
of agents for collaboration, and dividing the payoffs among the collaborated agents. In [39], a
general framework has been introduced for the study of constrained coalition formation. In this
framework a class of settings has been proposed to determine which agents should or should not
collaborate with each other. This class of constraints is then transformed to a structure to be able
to be used in coalition formation algorithms. This latter reduces any redundant computations
while identifying all the feasible coalition formations. Another challenge addressed in this pa-
per is about how to combine the feasible coalitions to have a more efﬁcient coalition structure.
The authors have tried to use simple but practical expressive constraints in this work. The con-
straint transformation algorithm which is a procedure to transform a set of deﬁned constraints
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into another isomorphic set is based on the Divide and Conquer approach. Building upon this
algorithm, an algorithm for optimal coalition structure generation in basic coalition formation
games is proposed.
The behavior of web services with the same functionalities and the architecture and interac-
tions between communities of web services within which these web services reside are discussed
in [15, 28, 32] . The proposed frameworks are all working based on reputation and QoS metrics.
In [15], mostly the architecture of the communities of web services and the performance metrics
as perceived by users and service providers are considered. The proposed framework focuses on
how to structure and update reputation, how to make it accessible and how to keep it up-to-date.
This reputation is important from two perspectives, users’ perspective so they can decide to se-
lect which community to send their requests to and providers’ perspective so that they can better
decide whether they should let their web services join a community or should not. The commu-
nities of web services are discussed from another point of view which is about the interactions
between web services inside a community and the communities with each other in [32]. The
ﬁrst one exhibits coopetition that is the simultaneous cooperative and competitive behaviors be-
tween web services and the second one is the competition between different communities of web
services. Inside a community, web services compete with each other to participate in web ser-
vice compositions since all of them offer the same functionality but with different non-functional
properties such as QoS metrics, and when a failure occurs, they cooperate with each other for
the substitution. Again for communities of web services both users and providers perspectives
should be taken into account. For service providers, the high participation rate of communities is
important and for users, their provided service and users satisfaction from the service is the main
factor for selecting a community. The process and the important factors in selecting web services
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inside a community which satisﬁes all three user, web service and community parties is the main
contribution in [28]. This selection is done by the master web service. The satisfaction of web
service is important because a satisﬁed web service will stay in the community and will offer
more services and it will affect the QoS of the community; contrarily, if a web service with an
average or high QoS leaves a community it can badly affect the promised QoS of the community
to the user.
The rest of the related works in this chapter are related to the coopetition in industrial ecosystem.
One of the industrial economy models that has been proposed as the multi agent architecture
is [42] which concerns the investigation of a life cycle of a network in which the agents change
dynamically. Here the agents are enterprises that can join or leave a network during the life cycle
of the network while the enterprises that operate outside the network are capable of evaluating
the participation in the network.
An explorative case study of two Swedish and one Finnish industries, within which both com-
petitive and cooperative relationships can be found at the same time is used in [4]. The concept
of coopetition and how to manage the different logics of cooperation and competition between
actors in industries and how to divide and manage these two different activities are investigated.
The authors show that each individual in a ﬁrm can just show one type of behavior at a time and
that, this division should be done between individuals or can be controlled by an intermediate
actor.
Negotiations were always characterized only as competitive transactions; a coopetitive negoti-
ation process has been provided in [11] that leads to a business insurance policy. Negotiation
is modeled as an iterative questions and answers which generate a common knowledge base of
client’s requirements and supplier’s quality of service. The characteristics of underwriting of the
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insurance policy are deﬁned based on this common knowledge base. The process of the common
knowledge base creation is a cooperative process.
The scheduling problem is addressed in [40, 41], i.e. the problem of assigning resources to a
production task in a distributed and dynamic environment. Coopetition approach is used to solve
the problem in two steps. In the ﬁrst step which is cooperation step, a Request Session is opened
and committed to a Request Session Agent. In the second step that is competition step, the
participating Product Agents compete with each other to gain their individual goals. This latter
is solved by means of the game theory.
A multi agent model to simulate coopetitive behaviors between companies in the supply chain
in a single market is proposed in [52]. By comparing two extreme behaviors of cooperation and
competition with coopetition, they show that the latter is a more effective strategy in long-term.
In this simulated environment, the ﬁrms select their partners randomly and based on the strat-
egy they adopt. Then a comparison between some statistical properties like degree distribution,
weight distribution and degree correlation is done and shows that strictly competitive strategies
dominate over strictly cooperative strategies in the markets. But yet in the long term, the coopet-
itive strategy makes more business friends and less production costs.
Matching potential beneﬁts of web services while cooperating with one another as a framework
is proposed in [17]. The interesting idea is to consider the beneﬁts under four categories: inno-
vation and learning, internal business process, customer, and ﬁnancial beneﬁts. This conceptual
framework uses the theory of balanced scorecard concept to provide a guideline for identifying
and deploying web services to enhance a ﬁrm’s competitive advantage. The balanced scorecard
is used as a performance management mean to keep track of the activities inside corporations.
Based on [17], unless the Web services technology is used to create or enhance an IT strategy
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that is aligned with the competitive strategy of the ﬁrm, the strategic beneﬁts of implementing
web services cannot be realized.
A dependable (i.e., intrusion-tolerant) infrastructure for cooperative web services coordination
that works based on the tuple space coordination model is presented in [2]. This infrastructure
processes interact through a shared memory abstraction where generic data structures are stored
and retrieved. The proposed infrastructure implements several security mechanisms that make
the system tolerate accidental faults as well as malicious attempts to disable the operation of
system components. This architecture provides the integration of a dependable tuple space on the
web services and allows the services to solve important problems like leader elections.
Another multi-agent model which is a knowledge-empowered agent information system is pro-
posed in [51]. This system uses a payoff mechanism as a means of rewarding consumers for
sharing their personal information with online businesses. In this system several agents employ
various knowledge and requirements for personal information valuation and interaction capabili-
ties that most users cannot do on their own. The agents work on behalf of consumers to categorize
their personal data objects, report to consumers on online businesses’ trust and reputation, deter-
mine the value of their compensation using risk-based ﬁnancial models, and ﬁnally negotiate for
a payoff value in return for the dissemination of users’ information. The aim of this incorporation
is to maximize the consumers’ beneﬁt.
To summarize, although many interesting frameworks have considered the coopetition strategies,
no one has considered the best response analysis, which we used to calculate the threshold in our
proposed framework, as a technique to decide when to compete and when to cooperate, particu-
larly in the context of communities, were agent-based web services are supposed to compete and
cooperate in different situations, which makes our proposal different from all the others.
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4.2 System Metrics
Task QoS (QoSttask) is the required QoS metric for a speciﬁc task at time t. Users deﬁne tasks
with speciﬁc QoS requirements such as response time, availability, and successability (or accu-
racy) [28]. We aggregate and normalize these metrics to a value between 0 and 1.
Web service QoS (QoStw) is the QoS provided by the web service w after performing a task at
time t. Again the metrics that contribute in computing this QoS are aggregated and normalized
to a value between 0 and 1. The offered quality might or might not meet the required task quality
QoSttask. In the latter case, the service user would be disappointed and a negative feedback is
expected. In our proposed system, both cases are considered when calculating the web services’
reputation.
Budget (Btw). Here we should mention that in our model, each web service has to pay a ﬁxed fee
as membership fee to the community to be able to reside in it. Btw is the amount of money the web
service w has in its disposal at time t, which helps pay for the community membership fees ()
and is one of the parameters that the web service considers when deciding about getting involved
in a competition or not which we are going to discuss more when calculating the conﬁdence of
the web service in Equation 19. This parameter has been used in other service computing settings
such as [28].
Reputation is a factor in any online community where trust is important. Without any trust
enabling mechanism, users cannot differentiate between services, specially the ones which offer
the same type of service. Reputation mechanisms usually aggregate users’ experiences and in our
case it strongly depends on QoS that each web service provides. Users deﬁne tasks with speciﬁc
quality QoSttask, therefore after performing a task with QoS
t
w, the reputation of w gets evaluated
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by the master web service. Reptw refers to the reputation of w at time t.
In Equation 17, we compute the reward, a value between 0 and 1, that the master web service
computes considering the task QoS compared with the web service provided quality QoStw. In
case the provided quality meets user expectations, the reward value would be positive. In this
system, we consider a small value as default reward η which the master considers together with
the proportional level of satisfaction as a weighted value (by υ). In this case, the higher the
provided quality is, the more weighted reward is. In case the provided quality does not meet the
user expectations, the reward will be negative. In this case, we also have a default penalty value ρ
(where ρ > η) together with the weighted proportional difference. The idea is to harshly penalize
the web services rather than rewarding them. To this end, rational web services should carefully
analyze their capabilities once the available tasks are announced. In our proposal, web services
have the goal of increasing their budget, which is directly related to their reputation. Thus, they

















The assigned reputation value is updated by the computed reward value. The computed reputation
of web service is bounded by the minimum and maximum reputation values 0 and 1. Let Γ =
Reptw + reward
t





Γ if 0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1;
0 if Γ < 0;
1 if Γ > 1.
(18)
Growth Factor is a parameter which declares web services’ performance based on their recent
strategies and activities. Growth factor is relative to web services’ reputation and QoS. This
parameter is the main variable a typical web service uses to decide which strategy to adopt. The
details about the decision making process is described in Section 4.3. We use Equation 19 to
compute the growth factor Gtw of the web service w at time t. The growth factor function should




w, which is satisﬁed by the equation and this
could be easily proven by calculating the partial derivatives of this function in 1)QoStw; 2)Rep
t
w;
and then 3) Btw and show that they are all positive. The contribution of the budget B
t
w in the
calculation of the growth factor should be proportional to the ideal budget βw × t where the web
service receives all the offered tasks during the periods t. The parameter βw denotes the proﬁt
obtained considering the mean received service fee μw and the cost of community membership .
The mean service fee depends on the strategy adopted by the web service because a competitive
service receives higher fees μw,CM compared to a cooperative one μw,CO (μw,CM > μw,CO). The
motivation behind this is that a competitive web service for a given task is considered as the leader
web service for that task while other cooperative web services are performing speciﬁc subtasks
as asked by the leader. For this reason, while considering to reward or penalize web services after
their service, the reward or penalty will be divided proportionally among cooperated web services
and the leader web service will receive more reward or penalty comparing to the cooperative ones.
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Table 4.1: List of proposed system parameters.
Notation Deﬁnition
QoSttask Required task QoS at time t
QoStw Web service w QoS at time t
Reptw Reputation assigned for w at time t
Rewardtw Reward to update the reputation
Gtw Growth factor of w at time t
τ tw Coopetitive threshold of w at time t
U tw Utility of w at time t
Btw Budget associated to web service w at time t
 The community membership fee
μw,CM Mean service fee for competing w
μw,CO Mean service fee for cooperating w
βw Proﬁt of w
COF tw Cooperation fee of w at time t
πtw,CM Competition payoff of w
πtw,CO Cooperation payoff of w
ptw,CM Competition probability of w at time t











βw = μw − 
μw ∈ {μw,CM , μw,CO}
(19)
The above explained parameters and other additional parameters which we will use in the rest of
this chapter are listed in Table 4.2.
4.3 Web Service Decision Making Procedure
Figure 4.1 illustrates the architecture of a typical community aggregating a number of web ser-
vices with different interactive strategies. Some of them compete for the task where they directly
deal with the master. Some others cooperate in the associated task where they only deal with the
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competed web service as the task leader and do not directly interact with the master (the mas-
ter deals only with the web service that has bid for the task, which is responsible of choosing
its collaborative network). In both sets, some web services are for certain moments out of any













Figure 4.1: A typical community of web services with competitive members and their collabora-
tion networks.
In the proposed system, the master recognizes the competing web services by checking their
competing ﬂags and sorts them based on some parameters (such as reputation) that we explain in
the rest of this section, and selects the top ranking one. If the web service is busy or unwilling
to take the task, the master allocates the task to the second competing web service in the list.
There is a chance that some tasks could not be assigned to any web service. These tasks are
accumulated to the task pool to be allocated in the next task allocation round. Upon allocation
of the task, the web service is responsible to provide the required QoS that is stated in the task
being generated by a service user. Afterwards, the master rewards or penalizes the competing
web service by upgrading or degrading its reputation according to the provided QoS compared
with the required one. This comparison inﬂuences the sorting mechanism used by the master to
allocate the tasks in further task allocation rounds.
The main goal of each individual web service is to increase its income (payoff). This income
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can be earned from tasks (or requests) done by this web service. In our model, web services
can decide to compete to get a task from the master web service or to cooperate with other web
services in a given collaborative network (the way a collaborative network is set by a leader is
based on the cooperative web services reputation and their QoS parameters that should coincide
with the required QoS). Therefore we deﬁne two types of web service strategies; when a web
service has higher level of conﬁdence based on its growth factor, it can compete to get a task
from the master and adopts the competitive strategy. On the other hand, when it has a lower
level of conﬁdence that it does not feel it can compete with other web services to get a task, the
web service waits for some other web services to cooperate with for completing a task and thus
it adopts the cooperative strategy. It is worth mentioning that this web service is not providing
any service alone, but only cooperates with other services. This means that over all provided
service is maintained at the certain level of quality. Web services estimate the outcome of all
the strategies and choose one of them accordingly. This decision is not static but can change
over time so web services can switch from one strategy to the other and this dynamic attitude is
referred to as coopetition. We discuss about this decision making process in more details in the
rest of this section.
The main part of web services’ decision making procedure falls into their growth factor analysis.
In fact, the growth factor and its comparison to a particular threshold is the main reason that
inﬂuences the web service’s decision to follow either competitive or cooperative behavior. Web
services initially compute this value and compare it with their computed threshold. Generally
the main challenge is the threshold computation and we cope with this issue in the rest of this
section. We additionally use the obtained results in the implemented environment and analyze
their effectiveness on web services’ strategic decision making procedures.
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Figure 4.2 shows the decision making process that is followed by a typical web service. In
case the web service is ready to compete, there is a chance that it bids for a task if it has the
required capabilities to accomplish that task, or stays silent and returns to the cooperative status.
But in case the web service is willing to cooperate, it has to wait for a cooperation opportunity
that could be triggered by another web service that competed and obtained the task, so both
web services will be part of the same collaborative network. Notice that we are not talking
about another possible strategy of the web service which is not getting involved in any task
accomplishment. Because in this case, the web service will have decrease in budget without
any gaining, considering that each web service has to pay membership fees to be able to stay
inside the community. In the decision making process presented in Figure 4.2, we assume that
the competing web service might get the task (denoted as Bid/obtainedTask) or not get the
task in case of being rejected by the master web service, or do not even bid for the task (denoted
as Silent/rejectedTask). For simplicity reasons and without loss of generality, we group the
two cases of Bids and obtainedTask together as well as Silent and rejectedTask. The rational
behind this aggregation is the fact that our main concentration is web services’ status (competitive
or cooperative) over different decision making rounds which could be caused by internal factors
(the web services) or by the external factor (the master web service).
Figure 4.2: Decision making process over competitive and cooperative strategies.
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Consider a web service w that is willing to compete (that means the computed growth factor
is more than the analyzed threshold τ tw). This web service can estimate the expected payoff
associated to this decision, called competition payoff. Equation 20 computes this expected pay-
off for web service w (πtw,CM ) considering the Bid/obtainedTask probability of p
t
w,CM and
Silent/rejectedTask probability of 1− ptw,CM .
πtw,CM = p
t
w,CM(μw,CM − COF tw − ) + (1− ptw,CM)(−) (20)
In Equation 20, μw,CM is the mean service fee that is assigned by the master web service to w.
This means that a competing web service w directly obtains this fee from the master web service.
Moreover, the competing web service w expects a cooperation fee (COF tw) that it gives to its
collaborators in case w needs to cooperate with other web services (cooperative web services in
its collaboration network). In any case, the competing or cooperating web service pays a ﬁxed
amount of membership () to the master web service as the coordinator of the community. This
fee would be taken into account when a web service decides to leave to a cheaper community or
act alone. But to concentrate on the main concerns of this chapter, we skip these small details.
Similar to the competitive web service case, if a web service w declares cooperative status, its
expected cooperation payoff (πtw,CO) is computed in Equation 21. In this equation, p
t
w,CO is the
probability of getting involved in a cooperative task with other web services and 1 − ptw,CO is
the probability of failure to ﬁnd such a cooperation opportunity. These two probabilities are
set when w decides to compete. We recall that μw,CO denotes the mean cooperation fee that is
directly obtained from the leader (i.e., the competitive) web service of the underlying collabora-
tive network. Compared to μw,CM , μw,CO is relatively smaller since the competitive web service
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generally dedicates a portion of its obtained income to pay other cooperative web services.
πtw,CO = p
t
w,CO(μw,CO − ) + (1− ptw,CO)(−) (21)
To analyze the expected payoffs obtained from different strategies, web services need to compute
the estimated probabilities that distinguish subcases in each behaviorial status (ptw,CM for com-
petitive and ptw,CO for cooperative). To estimate these probabilities, we should notice that they
are functions of web services’ reputation values (Reptw). Furthermore, p
t
w,CM is also function of





function of the reputation of other web services in the community because the leader is supposed
to be selective when it comes time to choose the collaborators. To this end, we ﬁrst discuss the
desirable properties of an estimation function of each of these probabilities, and show that the
proposed ones satisfy those properties. The desired properties of ptw,CM are as follows:
Property 4. ptw,CM is continuous with regard to Reptw, QoStw, and QoSttask.
Property 5. ptw,CM is monotonically increasing/decreasing in Reptw and QoStw −QoSttask while
QoStw −QoSttask is positive.
Property 6. ptw,CM is zero if QoStw −QoSttask is negative.
Property 7. The increase slope of ptw,CM is higher when the reputation Reptw increases in the
interval [0, 0.5] than when it increases in the interval [0.5, 1].
Property 4 simply says that the probability of successful competition ptw,CM can be always es-




task are available. Property 5 says that the reputation
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and QoS are two key factors that inﬂuence the value of ptw,CM in the sense of positive corre-
lation. Property 6 indicates that the probability ptw,CM is zero if the provided QoS is less than
the expectation. Property 7 promotes the increase of the reputation for new comers and imposes
higher increase rate at the beginning of the reputation curve because it is always hard to build the
reputation, but once it is built, its maintenance is less challenging.
The desired properties of ptw,CO are as follows:
Property 8. ptw,CO is continuous with regard to Reptw and the reputation of other web services
in the community.
Property 9. ptw,CO is monotonically increasing in Reptw and monotonically decreasing in the
community’s average reputation.
Property 10. The increase slope of ptw,CO is higher when the reputation Reptw increases in the
interval [0, 0.5] than when it increases in the interval [0.5, 1].
Property 8 is similar to Property 4. Property 9 says that w has more chance to get involved in a
cooperation if it has high reputation compared to the other members. This chance decreases if
other web services have higher reputations. Property 10 is similar to Property 7.
Equations 22 and 23 respectively compute the estimated success probability in cases where the
web service w is competing and cooperating. These values are computed considering web ser-
vice’s reputation value (Reptw computed by the master), web service’s provided QoS (QoSw), the
task required QoS (QoSttask) which is the mean required QoS computed from previous tasks, the
maximum provided QoS (QoStk, which is provided by another competitive web service k), and
the cooperative factor CLtw of the web service w at time t, which is computed as the portion of































as the function cos (the derivative of sin) is positive on [0, π
2
] and Reptw ∈ [0, 1]. The partial
derivative ∂ptw,CM with respect to QoS
t
w −QoSttask is also positive, which proves the satisfaction
of Property 5. Property 6 is straightforward. Finally, the increase slope of the function sin on
[0, π
2
] proves Property 7.
Similarly, we can easily prove that Equation 23 satisﬁes Property 8. Property 9 can be shown by
calculating the partial derivative ∂ptw,CO ﬁrst with regard to Rep
t





k/|Community|. The ﬁrst partial derivative
is positive and the second is negative, which proves the satisfaction of Property 9. The proof of
satisfaction of Property 10 is similar to the one of Property 7.
In this part, we compute the coopetition threshold that a typical web service could use to adopt
reasonable interacting strategies and we empirically verify the effectiveness of the obtained re-
sults in the next section. In fact, to decide which strategy to adopt, we let the web service w
compare its growth factor (Gtw) with the coopetition threshold it holds at current time t (τ
t
w) and
choose to compete with probability P tw that we compute in Equation 24. Based on this probability,







if Gtw ≤ τ tw;
1 otherwise.
(24)




w,CM) + (1− P tw)(πtw,CO) (25)
The key factor in the computation of the probability P tw and the associated utility is the threshold
value. To compute the threshold, we use the game theoretic best response technique. A typical
web service w will follow the best response strategy to maximize its expected aggregated payoff.
The idea is to equalize the expected payoffs of the two acting strategies: compete and cooperate.
The objective behind equalizing payoffs is to explore conditions under which the web service
w could react with best response to further decision making procedures. We use the obtained








ptw,CM(μw,CM − COF tw − ) + (1− ptw,CM)(−) = ptw,CO(μw,CO − ) + (1− ptw,CO)(−)
The ﬁxed membership fee  could be taken out and canceled from both sides of the equation so
we obtain the following:












By simplifying the sinus variable from both sides and substituting the cooperation factor CLtw
of the web service w we obtain the following:
QoStw −QoSttask
Maxk(Qostk −QoSttask)






We use the obtained equation to obtain the cooperation fee COF tw that is assigned by the web
service w. This fee represents the amount that w spends to cooperate with other web service(s)
to accomplish the task. By so doing, we obtain the maximum amount of cooperation fee that
the web service w can use to constrain the positive payoff out of competing. Otherwise, the web
service stays as cooperative entity. The cooperation fee is computed in Equation 26.










We use the maximum cooperation fee that a web service considers to constrain the positive ex-
pected payoff when the competitive strategy is adopted to update the threshold for the consequent
time interval (t + 1). We compare the maximum cooperation fee with the required fee (ReqF tw)
that the web service indicates to accomplish the task. The outcome of this comparison is a fac-
tor that uses the current threshold τ tw to compute the consequent threshold τ
t+1
w . As in online
learning, the idea is to compute iteratively the threshold until the ﬁxed point is achieved, which
indicates the threshold’s conversion, where the initial value is randomly chosen (in the simulation
different initial values are used). Equation 27 shows this computation.
To investigate the effectiveness of this threshold on the outcomes of the web services that follow
this reasoning technique, in the next section, we compare the results of different agents with





Θ if 0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1
1 if Θ > 1;
0 if Θ < 0.





In this section, we provide an empirical analysis over the observed results regarding the char-
acteristics of intelligent web services hosted in different communities of web services. In the
implemented system, we simulate the behaviors of service users as request generators, web ser-
vices as service providers, and master web services as community representatives. These entities
are developed with respect to what is explained in Section 4.2. The objective is to investigate the
effectiveness of the proposed strategic system on intelligent web services’ overall budget. We
study the overall performance of the community hosting the reasoning-empowered web services
compared to the ones hosting stochastic and purely competitive services.
The simulation application is written in CSharp.Net using Visual Studio.Net 2010
[12]. Developed web services are initialized with values taken from a real dataset [1]1. This
dataset represents 2507 real web services that exist on the web. It includes the QoS values of 9
parameters including availability, throughput and reliability. These QoS values were determined
by monitoring the web services over a 6 day period. We equip some of those web services with
our proposed strategic decision making procedure and compare the performance of the equipped
services against other ordinary web services.
1Our implemented framework uses the QWS dataset provided by Eyhab Al-Masri and Qusay H. Mahmoud that
is freely available at: www.uoguelph.ca/ qmahmoud/qws.
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We start our discussions with cumulative budget comparison regarding different communities
within which services follow different reasoning techniques. Figure 4.3 part (a) illustrates three
graphs for three different communities. Each community hosts web services that follow different
reasoning techniques:
1. a community that follows the interactive reasoning techniques presented in this chapter
(referred to as coopetitive),
2. a community that follows a random reasoning technique, so decisions about selecting com-
petitive or cooperative strategies are totally random (referred to as random coopetitive),
and
3. a competitive community where all services follow the competitive strategy (referred to as
competitive)
The proposed model’s reasoning mechanism enables services to effectively select their interact-
ing strategies and the obtained budget represents the best outcome over the strategic decision
making procedure they run all the time. This procedure avoids cases where a service selects the
competitive strategy but gets refused to obtain a task from the master. The procedure allows ser-
vices to make decisions that maximize their utilities, so that if the web service cannot compete,
the procedure would suggest to cooperate, which is better than competing and failing to obtain the
task. In this case (i.e., competing and not getting the task), the service stays idle but still pays the
community membership fee, which means losing utility. The developed strategic decision mak-
ing mechanism leads some web services to follow cooperative strategies that overall maintain an
optimal community budget. In the same Figure, we observe the cumulative budget of a commu-
nity where services follow random interacting strategies. The outcome is clearly lower because
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Figure 4.3: (a): Cumulative community budget comparison. (b): Average community reputation
comparison over different strategic decisions.
services at each run randomly decide over their acting strategies. This potentially inﬂuences the
community budget because a low quality service if randomly selects to follow the competitive
strategy, it will fail to get a task. This kind of strategy selection is totally stochastic while the task
allocation algorithm follows a logical path. The ideal system is the one that analyzes the optimal
strategic path and consistently follows strategies that bring maximum outcome. The result re-
garding the community that follows the random strategy shows how stochastic decision making
degrades the community budget, but still this result outperforms the one of the purely competitive
community. In the last case, all the services follow the competitive strategy and the frequency of
getting rejected from a task is relatively high. In a community with limited number of tasks, the
competitive strategy for all services highly inﬂuences the community budget because a potential
group of services are losing at every run.
The results illustrated in Figure 4.3 (a) verify the importance of the strategic decision making
procedure to logically decide over the possible competitive and cooperative choices. Figure 4.3
(b) illustrates average reputation of involved web services in communities. The graphs represent
the inﬂuence of the rewards that the master web service imposes to encourage highly capable
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web services to compete for a task. As for the cumulative budget, we observe that the coopetitive
community outperforms the random coopetitive and competitive communities in terms of aver-
age reputation. The proposed model’s average reputation increases because web services follow
optimal strategies where they can perform better so obtain higher rewards. For the same rea-
sons as for the cumulative budget, the average reputation of the random coopetitive community
outperforms the one for the competitive community.
In Figure 4.4 (a) and (b), we observe the competitive and cooperative probabilities of four differ-
ent web services where two of them (w1 and w3) are following optimal strategies (competitive for
w1 and cooperative for w3) and the two others (w2 and w4) are following non-optimal strategies.
Over elapsing runs, web services that follow optimal strategies bring best budget. In fact, the
master web service rewards the high quality web service that chooses the competitive strategy,
cooperates with other web services and successfully accomplishes the task. In this system, the
reputation regarding such a web service is increasing over time and the possibility of allocating
further tasks is increasing as well. By increasing the growth factor, such a web service (here
shown as w1) increases the probability of selecting the competitive strategy. On the other hand,
the other web service (here shown as w2) that is incapable of competing is penalized by the mas-
ter web service because the provided quality might not meet the required task quality. Thus, w2
degrades its growth factor by following the competitive strategy. As intelligent entity, this web
service is encouraged to change its strategy to the cooperative one and thus, its probability of se-
lecting the competitive strategy is decreasing over time. We have similar results in Figure 4.4 (b)
regarding web services w3 and w4 where unlike w4, w3 is strategically following the cooperative
strategy. Therefore, w4 is more seeking the competitive strategy where it can increase its growth
factor.
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Figure 4.4: Competitive and cooperative probabilities regarding four different web services.
Figure 4.5: Percentage of correct strategy selection in different runs using different initial thresh-
old values.
We conclude our analysis by discussing the percentage of correct strategy selection (Figure 4.5).
By this we mean the average of web services that can get a task when the coopetitive strategy is
followed. We observe that in different runs, this percentage is generally increasing. This shows
that over runs the web services get to learn the threshold τ tw that allows them to select the good
strategy. We should notice that in different runs different initial values of the threshold are used
ranging from 0.3 for run 1 to 0.6 for run 4.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we proposed a game-theoretic model to study and analyze the efﬁciency charac-
teristics of agent-based web services that can dynamically join and leave communities. We also
introduced a model incorporating a task allocation mechanism and decision making procedures
to help web services choose the best action over time. The proposed frameworks measure the
efﬁciency of web services considering their reputation, market share and capacity as well as ser-
vice users’ feedback. We proposed games where web services have to decide about joining and
leaving a community. We analyzed the existing Nash equilibria and situations where the maxi-
mum payoff is obtained. We also computed a threshold that web services can use to adopt the
best strategy and decide about competing or cooperating when they reside in a given community.
All the theoretical results were backed and supported by simulations where different parameters
are considered.
The resulting models show that the efﬁciency of the community and web services is increasing
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once the game-theoretic analysis is considered to impose parameters to control the decision of
joining and leaving the community and making decisions about the coopetition strategy.
5.2 Future Work
The analysis of efﬁciency and behaviors of web services inside the communities we conducted in
this thesis opens the door to many questions and research opportunities in the ﬁeld of web service
communities. Some of these opportunities can be listed as follows:
1. Considering reputation assessment for communities of web services and the role of user
agents as rational service consumers and their feedback for this assessment. Therefore,
reputation of communities of web services can play a signiﬁcant role in user’s service
selection.
2. Advancing the model in the second contribution to analyze the coopetitive interactions and
behaviors among communities of web services. Communities can exchange services or
tasks between each other and hence a new type of social behavior will be deﬁned among
these rational agents.
3. Enhancing the task sharing mechanism proposed in the second contribution to consider the
history of cooperation between web services inside the cooperative networks for selecting
the enthusiasm and more effective cooperative peers in the future interactions.
4. Considering malicious agents like the ones that provide false information to gain more
reputation, and their acts in the games and frameworks presented in this thesis. These
malicious behaviors can result in a bad reputation in cooperative networks modeled in the
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second contribution, so a new detection and prevention mechanism should be considered
from the master web service perspective as the controller of the community.
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